Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity:experimental evidence by Luhan, Wolfgang et al.
Real-Time Tacit Bargaining, Payoff
Focality, and Coordination Complexity:
Experimental Evidence*
Wolfgang Luhan† Anders Poulsen‡ Michael Roos§
February 12, 2017
Abstract
We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit
and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypothe-
ses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and
the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that
achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal out-
come requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to
settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior.
Keywords: bargaining; payoff focality; coordination complexity.
JEL Classification: C70; C72; C92.
*We thank the Editor, Advisory Editor, and two reviewers for their very helpful com-
ments. We also thank Carsten Crede, Fabio Galeotti, Itzhak Gilboa, Norman Isermann,
Emin Karago¨zog˘lu, Hans-Theo Normann, Andreas Orland, and the CBESS-UEA semi-
nar, ESA Heidelberg 2015, GATE-CNRS Lyon, and London Experimental Workshop 2015
participants for their helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, any errors are our
own.
†Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth Richmond Building, Portland
Street, Portsmouth PO1 3DE, United Kingdom. E-mail: wolfgang.luhan@port.ac.uk
‡Corresponding author. School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Exper-
imental Social Science, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR47TJ, United Kingdom.
E-mail: a.poulsen@uea.ac.uk.
§Lehrstuhl fu¨r Makroo¨konomik, Ruhr-Universita¨t Bochum, 44780 Bochum, Germany.
E-mail: michael.roos@rub.de.
1
The study of tacit bargaining – bargaining in which communi-
cation is incomplete or impossible – assumes importance, there-
fore, in connection with limited war, or, for that matter, with
limited competition, jurisdictional maneuvers, jockeying in a
traffic jam, or getting along with a neighbor that one does not
speak to. (Schelling (1960), p. 53)
1 Introduction
In this paper we report the findings from an experiment that aims to cap-
ture bargaining environments with the following features. First, decisions
are non-cooperatively made in real time—the players cannot sign binding
contracts that regulate their current and future behavior, and there are no
externally imposed constraints on how often players can revise their de-
cisions. Second, there is a surplus that consists of one or more indivisible
items (such as parcels of land, fishing spots, or geographically distinct sales
districts).1 The surplus renews continuously, and the players’ chosen ac-
tions generate payoffs that they immediately receive and cumulate over the
time period. Third, the stage game played at every time instant has mul-
tiple Nash equilibria, and the players prefer different equilibria. Finally,
interaction is tacit – the players can not communicate via cheap talk (see,
e.g., Farrell and Rabin (1996) and Schelling (1960)).
Let us describe some real world situations with the features described
above.
Duopoly Two firms, producing an identical good and selling it in two
geographically separated markets, choose non-cooperatively, tacitly, and
in real time how much to offer for sale in each market, and cumulate prof-
its over time. Each market can only sustain one firm, and markets differ in
profitability.
Neighbors Two neighbors who cannot or prefer not to talk (cf the quote
from Schelling above) decide when and for how long to use a shared out-
door area, playground, and parking area. Each facility has capacity for a
single user only, or the neighbors prefer not to meet at the same place.
1Rather than consisting of items that are physically indivisible, we may think of the
surplus as consisting of divisible objects that, due to complementarities in production or
consumption, are of use only if certain quantities are held by the same player.
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Common pool resource Fishermen from different villages who do not
communicate with each other decide in real time which fishing spots to
occupy and for how long (this is a common pool resource situation—see
Ostrom et al. (1994)). Each fisherman prefers to get a fishing spot for him
or herself, but if several fishermen try to take the same spot, there will be
a costly dispute.
These situations are not ‘standard’ negotiation situations—no discus-
sion takes place around a negotiation table, there is no exchange of offers
and counteroffers, and no contracts are signed. Nevertheless, our envi-
ronment has an essential element of bargaining at its core, since there are
many possible ways the players can divide the assets between them over
the time period, and there is a conflict of interest (each would like to con-
sume all the resources at every moment in time); and a failure to ‘agree’
(which in our context means that the assets are in dispute) leads to an infe-
rior outcome for all players. However the players are not only faced with
the problem of tacitly agreeing on which overall payoffs they should aim
for – they need to coordinate on an intertemporal behavior that achieves
these overall payoffs. There are many of these, so this amounts to solving
a coordination problem. Thus the players effectively face both a bargain-
ing and a coordination problem, and both must be tackled simultaneously,
tacitly, and in real time.2
We focus on two aspects that we thought would be important in a real-
time tacit bargaining environment. First, a well-known hypothesis is that
bargainers may be able to coordinate on a focal outcome of the game (see
Isoni et al. (2014), Roth (1985), Roth (1995), and Schelling (1960)).3 We ex-
pected that payoff-based sources of focality (payoff focality), such as equal-
ity, efficiency, and total payoff maximization, would influence behavior.4
2We thank a reviewer and the Associate Editor for their comments which helped us to
clarify the relationship between the bargaining and coordination element.
3In general, sources of focality include symmetry, payoff efficiency, payoff equality,
total payoff maximization, earned entitlements, and historical precedent (see for example
Van Huyck et al. (1990) and Huyck et al. (1992), Anbarci and Feltovich (2013), Anbarci
and Feltovich (2016), Ga¨chter and Riedl (2005), Galeotti et al. (2016), Isoni et al. (2013),
Isoni et al. (2014), Janssen (2006), Roth and Murnighan (1982), Schelling (1960), Sugden
(1986), and Young (1993)). There is also an experimental literature on ‘label salient’ focal
points; see Blume and Gneezy (2000), Blume and Gneezy (2010), Crawford et al. (2008),
Isoni et al. (2013), and Isoni et al. (2014).
4In this paper “efficiency” means Pareto-efficiency, measured in money terms. A “total
payoff maximizing outcome” maximizes the sum of players’ money earnings. Such an
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Second, we conjectured that the complexity of coordinating on an in-
tertemporal behavior that achieves the focal payoffs (coordination complex-
ity) would also be behaviorally relevant.
We observe that high coordination complexity is detrimental to coor-
dination. Also, bargainers tend to settle on equal and inefficient payoffs
if the behavior giving equal and efficient payoffs is too complex. Further-
more, coordination complexity affects how bargainers trade off equality
and efficiency.
These findings strongly suggest that we cannot expect outcomes of
real-world ongoing tacit bargaining situations to be efficient, if efficiency
requires an intertemporal behavior that is too complex relative to other be-
haviors that give inefficient but reasonable payoffs. Moreover, we can not
deduce bargainers’ efficiency and equality concerns from their observed
behavior, since this also depends on coordination complexity.
We are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to report experimental
data for real time bargaining situations, but there are clear connections to
several other research areas.5 A recent group of papers study strategic
environments where decisions are made and payoffs earned in real (effec-
tively, continuous) time. See, for example, Bigoni et al. (2015), Friedman
et al. (2004), Friedman et al. (2015), Friedman and Oprea (2012), Oprea
et al. (2011), and Oprea et al. (2014), but as far as we know no study con-
sidered bargaining situations.6
We also contribute to the experimental bargaining literature by con-
sidering a setting where players make moves and earn payoffs in real
time. We can interpret this as an environment where there are no property
rights, or they are not enforced. There is no third party who can impose
and enforce some notion of ‘agreement’ (or an exogenous disagreement
outcome), and who can prevent players from claiming parts of the sur-
outcome is efficient, but the converse is not true. As an example, consider two Player 1
and 2 money divisions, (6, 6) and (5, 10). Both are efficient, but only the latter maximizes
total payoffs.
5In his book, The Strategy of Conflict (1960), Thomas Schelling gives a general discus-
sion of tacit bargaining situations (see for example p. 102–108) and describes in Schelling
(1961) an experimental design where pairs of subjects tacitly decide which parts of the
United States to occupy. Some preliminary experimentation was done but no data were
published (Schelling, personal communication).
6In Camerer et al. (2015) and Galeotti et al. (2016) players make proposals in real time,
but earnings are not cumulated over time, and an agreement is assumed to be binding
and terminates interaction.
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plus whenever they wish.
There are also several important differences between the environment
studied in the current paper and those considered in the experimental and
theoretical literature on cooperative behavior in repeated games (see, for
example, Bhaskar (2000), Bjedov et al. (2016), Bornstein et al. (1997), Ca-
son et al. (2013), Evans et al. (2015), Kaplan and Ruffle (2012), Kuzmics
and Rogers (2012), Kuzmics et al. (2014), Lau and Mui (2008), and Lau
and Mui (2012)). First, unlike these studies our bargaining environment
has no exogenous period structure with simultaneous moves in each pe-
riod. Second, while many of these studies typically restrict attention to
symmetric 2 × 2 stage games, such as Battle of the Sexes or Prisoner’s
Dilemma, where a quite simple efficient intertemporal behavior is focal
(namely, alternate such that each player gets his preferred outcome in ev-
ery other period), we consider stage games with asymmetric payoffs and
more than two (namely four) strategies. This creates a strategic environ-
ment with qualitatively new features. More precisely, the time proportions
with which different stage game outcomes need to be coordinated on in or-
der to generate equal and efficient payoffs of the overall game differ from
one-half. Furthermore, the stage game can offer an equal payoff outcome
that is efficient among the pure stage game payoffs but strictly dominated
by an equal and efficient payoff pair of the overall game. We observe that
many bargainers settle on the former outcome, which we attribute to its
lower coordination complexity. These findings have, as far as we know,
no counterparts in the existing literature.
2 The Bargaining Environment
2.1 The Bargaining Stage Game
There are one or two indivisible assets, each with some strictly positive
value to each player. When there is a single asset, players simultaneously
decide to claim or not to claim the asset. In the case of two assets, each
player claims one of the assets, both assets, or neither. If a player is the
only one to claim an asset, then he or she gets it. If both players claim an
asset (it is in dispute), no one gets it.7 The assets can be valued differently
7Our assumption that conflict over an asset completely destroys its value for both
players is admittedly extreme. In practice there may still be some sharing of the asset,
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by the players. A player who holds an asset receives the value of the asset.
The number and values of the assets are common knowledge.8
This bargaining stage game has several Nash equilibria. With two as-
sets it is an equilibrium that each player claims a different asset, as is the
outcome where one player claims one asset and the other asset is in dis-
pute, as well as each player claiming both assets. There are also many
mixed equilibria. In the single asset case it is an equilibrium that the asset
is claimed by only one player, or by both players. It can be verified that
for each player the strategy of claiming all assets weakly dominates any
other strategy. The only undominated equilibrium of the stage game is
thus where each player claims all assets and equilibrium payoffs are zero.
2.2 The Repeated Bargaining Game
The bargaining period has a fixed and commonly known length, which in
the experiment equals 240 seconds. The computer takes a reading every
1/10 of a second. There are thus 2400 periods.
In each period the players simultaneously choose a pure strategy in
the bargaining stage game and get the corresponding payoffs. In what fol-
lows, “strategy” always means a pure stage game strategy. Overall pay-
offs is the undiscounted sum of the period payoffs. Subjects did not have
to choose a strategy every period (this would clearly be physically impos-
sible given the very short period length); they only had to submit a new
strategy when they wished to change their currently submitted strategy,
and they could do this as often as they wished.
The repeated game has a large set of Nash equilibria (as is the case
for most finitely repeated games; see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
and Mailath and Samuelson (2006)) which differ in their efficiency and
distributional properties. The time horizon is finite, but, since there is a
multiplicity of Nash equilibria in the stage game, backward induction will
as in our motivating examples. And, as was pointed out by a reviewer, while values are
reduced by dispute the original holder may still earn more than the new claimant. The
important thing, however, is that conflict over an asset leads to inefficiency, and we see
our assumption as a simple way to capture this in the experiment.
8A reviewer pointed out that in many real situations payoffs are likely to be private
information. We agree that the assumption of complete information can be unrealistic,
but leave the study of privately known payoffs for future research.
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not refine the set of equilibria.9
3 The Experimental Stage Games
Denote an asset with value x to Player 1 and value y to Player 2 as (x, y).
In order to test hypotheses about payoff focality and coordination com-
plexity, we used five stage games:
• Stage Game 1: There is a single asset, (20, 20).
• Stage Game 2: There are two assets, (4, 4) and (16, 16).
• Stage Game 3: There is a single asset, (32, 8).
• Stage Game 4: There are two assets, (7, 15) and (9, 7).
• Stage Game 5: There are two assets, (8, 20) and (6, 8).
As stated earlier, the number and values of the assets are common knowl-
edge. Table 1 below shows the payoff matrix for Stage Game 5. All payoff
matrices are in Online Appendix 1. Assets (8,20) and (6,8) are denoted as
1 and 2, respectively. Each player’s four pure strategies are: claim neither
asset (denoted ‘0’); claim only Asset 1 (‘1’); claim only Asset 2 (‘2’), and
claim both assets (‘12’). In games with a single asset, the strategies are:
claim the asset (1) or not (0).
0 1 2 12
0 0, 0 0, 20 0, 8 0, 28
1 8, 0 0, 0 8, 8 0, 8
2 6, 0 6, 20 0, 0 0, 20
12 14, 0 6, 0 8, 0 0, 0
Table 1: Payoff matrix for Stage Game 5: (8,20),(6,8).
Figure 1 shows the feasible Player 1 and 2 average payoffs of the five games
(i.e., the feasible total payoffs divided by 2400). In the figures these are de-
noted pi1 and pi2. The average payoffs from playing the same stage game
9More precisely, any individually rational payoff of the bargaining stage game can
be sustained in a Nash equilibrium of the repeated bargaining game as the number of
periods becomes very large; see Benoit and Krishna (1987).
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outcome in every period is, of course, equal to the stage game payoffs.
These average payoff pairs are shown as black dots in the figures. In what
follows, “payoffs” mean average payoffs.
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Figure 1: Feasible average payoffs in the five bargaining games. Black
dots indicate payoffs that can be obtained from playing the same stage
game outcome throughout the bargaining period. The solid line segments
are the efficient frontier. The hollow dot is the equal and efficient payoff
pair, E.
Consider any two payoff pairs and some payoff pair on the line seg-
ment connecting them. The players can generate this payoff in the game
by coordinating on an intertemporal behavior where they play each of the
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stage game outcomes a certain proportion of the time.10
An important feature of our bargaining environment is that there are
many intertemporal behaviors (in continuous time, an infinite number)
that ensure that different stage game outcomes are played certain propor-
tions of time.For example, in Stage Game 1, achieving payoffs (10, 10) re-
quires that each player holds the asset half of the time; this can be achieved
by an intertemporal behavior where players swap the asset at certain time
intervals, e.g., every 5 seconds; another intertemporal behavior that achieves
the same swaps assets every 10, and a third swaps them every 20 seconds,
and so on. It is therefore not a priori obvious for how long players should
hold the asset before it is swapped.11 In addition to having to agree on
which payoffs of the game they should aim for, the players face a coor-
dination problem in selecting a specific intertemporal behavior achieving
those payoffs, and both must be tackled tacitly and in real time.
4 Hypotheses
4.1 Payoff Focality
Our predictions about payoff focality are straightforwardly based on find-
ings from the existing experimental bargaining literature, which has found
that there are typically several potentially payoff focal outcomes in a bar-
gaining game (see for example Isoni et al. (2014) and Roth and Murnighan
(1982)). The focal candidates include the efficient and equal payoff pair,
E; unequal and efficient pairs, especially if they offer larger total earnings
than E; we predict that inefficient payoffs are not payoff focal.
Applying these criteria to our five games gives Hypothesis 1 below and
the characterization in the second column of Table 2 below. A few remarks
are in order. In Game 2 we predict that the payoffs (4,16) and (16,4) are too
unequal to be focal relative to (10,10). In Game 4 and 5 we predict that the
payoffs (7,7) and (8,8) are not payoff focal since they are strictly dominated
by the equal and efficient payoff pair, E.
10This is only approximately true since the number of periods is finite.
11In our setting this difficulty is compounded by the fact that there is no obvious ‘pe-
riod’ (say hour, day, or week). Strictly speaking, a ‘period’ in our experiment lasts 1/10
seconds, but this is clearly not behaviorally relevant for the subjects.
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Game Predicted focal pay-
offs
Intertemporal behaviors generating focal payoffs
Game 1:
(20,20)
E = (10, 10). Time varying: Each player holds the asset half the
time.
Game 2:
(4,4),(16,16)
E = (10, 10). Time varying: i) Each player holds both assets half
of the time. ii) Half of the time one player holds A1
and the other player holds A2, and the other half
the opposite happens. iii) Player 1 always holds
A1 and 5/8 (3/8) of the time Player 1 (2) holds A2.
iv) Player 1 always holds A2 and 3/8 (5/8) of the
time Player 1 (2) holds A1. v) Players coordinate
on holding the assets such that each of the payoffs
(0,20), (4,16), (16,4), and (20,0) occur a proportion
1/4 of the time. vi) The players coordinate on any
three of the four stage game payoffs with time pro-
portions giving payoffs (10,10).
Game 3:
(32,8)
E = (6.4, 6.4) and
any payoff (pi1,pi2)
on the efficient fron-
tier below E.
(6.4,6.4): Time varying. Player 1 (2) holds the asset
a proportion 1/5 (4/5) of the time. (pi1,pi2): Time
varying. Player 1 (2) holds the asset a proportion
pi1/32 ((32− pi1)/32) of the time.
Game 4:
(7,15),(9,7)
(9,15), E =
(10.9, 10.9), and
any payoff (pi1,pi2)
on efficient frontier
connecting (9,15) and
E.
(9,15): Time constant: Player 1 holds A2 and Player
2 holds A1 throughout the period. E = (10.9, 10, 9):
Time varying. Player 1 always holds A2; A1 is held
by Player 1 (2) a proportion 3/11 (8/11) of the time.
(pi1,pi2): Time varying. Player 1 always holds asset
A2, and A1 is held by Player 1 a proportion (pi1 −
9)/7 of the time, and Player 2 holds it the remaining
time.
Game 5:
(8,20),(6,8)
(6,20), E = (10, 10),
and any payoff
(pi1,pi2) on efficient
frontier connecting
(6,20) and E.
(6,20): Time constant. Player 1 holds A2 and Player
2 holds A1 throughout the period. E = (10, 10):
Time varying. Player 1 always holds A2; A1 is held
by each player half the time. (pi1,pi2): Time vary-
ing. Player 1 always holds A2, and A1 is held by
Player 1 a proportion (pi1 − 6)/8 of the time, and
Player 2 holds it the remaining time.
Table 2: Predicted payoff focal outcomes and intertemporal behaviors generating the focal
payoffs in each of the five games. Note: In Games 3, 4, and 5, A1 = Asset 1 and A2 = Asset 2.
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Hypothesis 1. a. In Games 1 and 2 bargainers achieve payoffs E = (10, 10).
b. In Game 3 bargaining pairs achieve a payoff pair on the efficient frontier equal
to, or to the right of, E = (6.4, 6.4).
c. In Game 4 subjects achieve payoffs E = (10.9, 10.9), or (9, 15), or any payoff
pair on the efficient frontier between them. No bargaining pairs settle on payoffs
(7,7), since they are strictly dominated by E = (10.9, 10.9).
d. In Game 5, subjects achieve payoffs E = (10, 10), or (6, 20), or any payoff
pair on the efficient frontier between them. No bargaining pairs settle on payoffs
(8, 8), since they are strictly dominated by E = (10, 10).
4.2 Coordination Complexity
Consider some feasible payoff pair, pi = (x, y). We think of the coordina-
tion complexity of pi as measuring how difficult it is for players to coordi-
nate on an intertemporal behavior that generates payoffs pi. We distin-
guish between a time-constant intertemporal behavior, where the players
play the same stage game outcome throughout the bargaining period, and
a time-varying behavior, where they select different stage game outcomes
different proportions of time. It is intuitively more difficult to coordinate
on a time-varying than a time-constant behavior, since the former requires
that each player holds the assets a certain proportion of time. Recall also,
as pointed out in Section 3, that there are many intertemporal behaviors
that achieve these aggregate time proportions.12 So we predict that it is
more difficult for players to achieve a given payoff pair pi if it requires a
time-varying than a time-constant behavior.
The last column in Table 2 describes the intertemporal behaviors that
are required for generating the payoff focal outcomes described in the pre-
vious section.13
We now develop some hypotheses for how payoff focality and coor-
dination complexity interact. Our first prediction is that, ceteris paribus,
higher coordination complexity is detrimental for earnings. Games 1 and 2 have
the same feasible payoffs and are predicted to have the same unique focal
payoff pair, E = (10, 10), but the coordination complexity of E (in fact of
12As mentioned in the Introduction, the players thus face a coordination problem in
selecting a specific time varying behavior from the set of all the time varying behaviours
that achieve the required aggregate time proportions.
13These are straightforward to compute—see Online Appendix 4.
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any payoff on the efficient frontier) is higher in Game 2 than in 1, since
there are more time-varying behaviors generating E in Game 2 than in 1
(cf. table 2).
Hypothesis 2. Player 1 and 2’s earnings in Game 2 are below those in Game 1,
due to higher coordination failure in Game 2 than in Game 1.
Suppose now that achieving an equal and efficient outcome E requires a
time-varying behavior, and suppose also there is a time-constant behav-
ior that gives equal but inefficient payoffs (cf Games 4 and 5). Our third
hypothesis is that bargainers settle on a time constant behavior giving equal
but inefficient payoffs instead of the time varying equal and efficient behavior, but
only if the equal stage game payoffs are not dominated by other stage game pay-
offs. In other words, the bargainers are willing to abandon an equal and
efficient outcome of the overall game if this requires a complex coordina-
tion behavior – but when considering simpler coordination schemes they
are unwilling to sacrifice efficiency for equality. In this sense efficiency has
priority over equality among the time constant behaviors.
Hypothesis 3. a. In Game 5 significantly more bargaining pairs settle on a time-
constant behavior giving payoffs (8, 8) than on a time-varying behavior giving
payoffs E = (10, 10). b. In Game 4 no bargainers settle on the time-constant
behavior giving payoffs (7,7) since it is strictly dominated by the time-constant
behavior giving payoffs (9,15).
We also predict that complexity differences between payoffs along the efficient
frontier affect how bargainers trade off equality and surplus maximization con-
cerns. Observe that along the efficient frontier in Game 3 the equal payoff,
E, is as complex to settle on as unequal payoffs, while in Games 4 and 5
payoff E is more complex than the alternative payoffs, (9,15) and (6,20).
Hypothesis 4. Significantly fewer bargaining pairs generate equal payoffs E in
Games 4 and 5 than in Game 3.
Our last hypothesis is that if there are complexity differences within the set
of time-varying behaviors, then bargainers settle on the simpler ones even if it
leads to a loss of efficiency. In Game 5 players can achieve any payoff on the
line connecting (8,8) and (6,20) by coordinating on a time-varying behavior
where they swap the assets and hold each a certain proportion of time; this
12
leads to an inefficient outcome, but it is arguably simpler than the time-
varying behavior required for getting on the efficient frontier, namely (cf
Table 2) that Player 1 half of the time holds both assets and the (8,20) asset
is held by each half the time.
Hypothesis 5. In Game 5 significantly more bargainers tend to settle on an
inefficient time-varying behavior generating payoffs on the line connecting (8,8)
and (6,20) than on an efficient time-varying behavior generating payoffs on the
frontier between E and (6,20).
5 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experi-
mental Social Science (CBESS) at University of East Anglia (Norwich, UK).
156 subjects took part. The subjects were undergraduates and postgradu-
ates from the sciences and humanities. There were eight sessions. Sessions
lasted between 50 and 60 minutes. Average earnings (including the £3 par-
ticipation fee) were £12.49. Recruitment was done using ORSEE (Greiner
(2015)). The experiment was programmed and conducted with the soft-
ware z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
Upon arrival, subjects were seated at desks. Each subject received a
hard copy of the instructions (see Online Appendix 1). These were read
out by the experimenter. The instructions explained that each subject would
play five bargaining games (called “scenarios” in the instructions), each
against a randomly selected co-participant.14 Each scenario lasted four
minutes (240 seconds). Participants were explained that they would be
referred to as either the Red or the Blue player, and that they would keep
this role in all five scenarios. Participants did not know the five scenarios
before playing them.
Participants were then introduced to the decision interface, using a
live step-by-step tutorial explaining all features of the screen. The screen
showed the asset(s) (referred to as “objects”), visually represented by cir-
14In each session all participants encountered the games in the same order. We used
two orders, 2, 3, 1, 5, 4 and 4, 5, 1, 3, 2. We considered the data for each game order and
found no systematic order effects (details are available from the authors upon request),
and therefore pooled the data.
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cles (see the screenshot in Figure 5 below).15 Inside each circle was written
the value of the asset to each player, in terms of points. The first number
always referred to the Blue player’s value, and the second number was the
Red player’s value. The total number of earned points would be converted
into pounds at the end of the experiment.
Figure 2: Screenshot. Objects were colored, as explained in the main text.
The field “Held by no one” (“Held by Blue”) [“held by Red”] [[“in dis-
pute”]] is colored white (blue) [red] [[yellow]].
In each scenario a subject could click with his or her mouse on an ob-
ject. They could click on as many objects as they liked, and as often as they
liked, during the four minutes.
Subjects were then explained the rules:
• At the beginning of each scenario, all objects are white. This indicates
that no one holds any objects.
15Similar representations have been used in other experiments; see Isoni et al. (2013),
Isoni et al. (2014), and Mehta et al. (1994).
14
• If the Red (Blue) player clicks on a white object, then the Red (Blue)
player holds the object and gets its value, and the object then gets the
color of the player who clicked on it (blue or red).
• If an object is already held by one of the players (such that it has a
red or blue color), and the other player then clicks on it, the object is
in dispute. This means that no player holds the object, so no one gets
its value. To show this, the object turns yellow.
• If one player holds an object (so it has that player’s color), and he or
she then clicks on it again, then that player gives up the object. Then
no one holds it, so the object gets a white color.
• If an object is in dispute (yellow color) and a player clicks on it, then
the other player holds it, so it gets the other player’s color.
The point-and-click interface allows participants to easily make and change
their decisions. As already mentioned, participants only needed to click
when they wanted to change their existing claims—the computer main-
tained their claim on their behalf until they made a new claim using their
mouse.
Next, subjects were explained the rules governing how they earned
points: as long as an object was in a subject’s possession, he or she would
get its value per unit of time. More precisely, the income from holding any
object was recalculated every 10th of a second and added up. The total
income is the sum of the total income from each of the objects.
Subjects were provided with real-time earnings information on the screen.
In the lower right corner, they were shown a table with two columns. The
first column showed the subjects’ total point income from each object, and
the total income. The second column showed the co-partipant’s income.
These numbers were updated every tenth of a second.
At the end of the session, the computer randomly selected one of the
five scenarios. The total number of earned points in this scenario was
converted into pounds using the exchange rate: 100 points = 5.3 pence (=
£0.053). In other words, £1 = 1887 points. While the calculation of pay-
ments was done without any rounding, the final payment was rounded
up to the nearest full 5 pence, in order to facilitate the payment procedure.
After the instructions had been read out, a short on-screen tutorial was
shown on participants’ screens, showing subjects how to use the interface.
Any questions were answered, and the experiment began.
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6 Results
6.1 Overview
For each bargaining pair, the state of bargaining at time t is given by the
strategy profile, that is, each subject’s chosen stage game strategy at that
time. From now on “strategy ” always means pure stage game strategy.
Table 3 shows the proportion of time each strategy profile was ob-
served in each of the five games. The assets are denoted 1 and 2 (in Games
1 and 3 the single asset is denoted 1). A strategy profile is denoted (i, j),
where in games with two assets i, j = 0, 1, 2, 12 denote the four strategies
of claiming neither asset, claiming only Asset 1, claiming only Asset 2, and
claiming both assets. For example, strategy profile (2,12) is where Player 1
demands only Asset 2 and Player 2 demands both assets. In Games 1 and
3, the two strategies are denoted 0 and 1.
Table 4 shows data on various outcome measures. The first row gives
subjects’ average earnings in each player role. Total Payoff Efficiency (TPE)
measures the extent to which subjects maximized total earnings.16 Close-
ness to the Efficient Frontier (CEF) is a measure of how close a payoff vec-
tor is to the efficient frontier.17 In Games 1 and 2, TPE = CEF.18 Earnings
Inequality is the average within-pair difference in earnings.19 The row
Asset Holding Durations states, for each asset, the proportion of time the
asset was held by Player 1 and 2, respectively. For example, in Game 2 the
(16,16) asset was held by Player 1 (2) 33.56% (30.22%) of the time. There are
two sources of inefficiency in our bargaining environment, both or neither
16Consider one of the five games and suppose average payoffs are pi = (x, y), where
x (y) is Player 1’s (2’s) average payoff. Total Payoff Efficiency of pi is the ratio of total
earnings to the maximum possible total earnings, i.e., TPE = (x + y)/M, where M =
20, 20, 32, 26, 26 in the five games.
17Consider the payoff pair pi = (x, y), where x (y) are Player 1’s (2’s) earnings. Assum-
ing that x > 0 and y > 0, consider the vector pi′ from the origin, obtained by extending
pi until it reaches the efficient frontier. Denote by pi the length of the vector pi. We then
define the Closeness to the Efficient Frontier of pi as α = pi/pi′. We have 0 < α ≤ 1. If
α = 1, pi is on the efficient frontier. If α < 1, the subjects only achieved a fraction α of full
efficiency. If pi = (0, 0), we set α = 0.
18 Efficiency requires that all assets are held by someone, and since in Game 1 and 2 all
assets have the same value to each player, any such state also maximizes total earnings.
19We compute for each bargaining pair the absolute difference between the subjects’
earnings, and then compute the average across all bargaining pairs.
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Strategy
Profile
Game 1:
(20,20)
Game 2:
(16,16),(4,4)
Game 3:
(32,8)
Game 4:
(7,15),(9,7)
Game 5:
(8,20),(6,8)
(0, 0) 1.73 0.15 1.03 0.04 0.02
(0, 1) 36.44 0.59 49.77 0.50 0.68
(0, 2) – 0.98 – 0.25 0.09
(0, 12) – 2.77 – 1.13 0.73
(1, 0) 37.47 0.27 21.90 0.27 0.50
(1, 1) 23.92 0.21 26.83 0.48 0.96
(1, 2) – 24.17 – 7.55 35.43
(1, 12) – 2.29 – 1.82 3.49
(2, 0) – 0.54 – 0.99 0.25
(2, 1) – 26.33 – 64.19 30.21
(2, 2) – 1.23 – 0.42 0.13
(2, 12) – 5.65 – 1.45 1.15
(12, 0) – 3.85 – 3.61 5.22
(12, 1) – 2.83 – 4.11 5.64
(12, 2) – 6.99 – 1.70 1.83
(12, 12) – 20.60 – 10.84 13.13
Table 3: The percentage of time each strategy profile was observed in each of
the five bargaining games. The numbers are averages across all bargaining
pairs.
subject claiming an asset. The row Asset Dispute Rates gives the percent-
age of time where each asset was claimed by both subjects. Finally, the
row Asset Idleness Rates gives the percentage of time where neither sub-
ject claimed the asset.
Figures 3 – 7 show scatterplots of the payoffs in each of the five games
(each dot is the payoffs obtained by a pair of subjects). Due to the chosen
scaling, only a part of the efficient frontier is shown.
The data just described are averages across bargaining pairs. The reader
may however be interested in the the dynamics of individual bargaining
pairs. Online Appendix 6 contains a description of the bargaining dynam-
ics of a broadly representative set of bargaining pairs.
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Game 1:
(20,20)
Game 2:
(4,4),(16,16)
Game 3:
(32,8)
Game 4:
(7,15),(9,7)
Game 5:
(8,20),(6,8)
Player 1 and
2 average
earnings
7.50,7.29 6.78,6.25 7.01,3.98 7.40,10.75 5.93,9.75
Total Payoff
Efficiency
(TPE) (%)
73.9 65.2 34.3 75.6 56.0
Closeness
to Efficient
Frontier
(CEF) (%)
73.9 65.2 72.4 79.2 70.7
Earnings In-
equality
0.63 1.52 3.08 3.86 4.31
Asset Hold-
ing Du-
rations
(%)
37.47,36.44 (4,4):
35.29,35.34
(16,16):
33.56,30.22
21.90,
49.77
(7,15):
13.13,67.27
(9,7):
72.90,10.76
(8,20):
42.99,32.77
(6,8):
41.32, 39.73
Asset Dis-
pute Rates
(%)
23.92 (4,4): 25.93
(16,16): 34.47
26.83 (7,15): 17.25
(9,7): 14.40
(8,20): 23.22
(6,8): 16.25
Asset Idle-
ness rates
(%)
1.73 (4,4): 2.91
(16,16): 1.22
1.03 (7,15): 1.69
(9,7): 1.28
(8,20): 0.48
(6,8): 2.16
Table 4: Aggregate data. All data are means, computed across all bargaining pairs.
Note: In Games 1 and 2, TPE = CEF, by definition (see main text).
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of average payoffs pairs in Game 1.
Figure 4: Scatter plot of average payoffs pairs in Game 2.
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Figure 5: Scatter plot of average payoffs pairs in Game 3.
Figure 6: Scatter plot of average payoffs pairs in Game 4.
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Figure 7: Scatter plot of average payoffs pairs in Game 5.
6.2 Assessing the Hypotheses
Games 1 and 2 In Game 1 Player 1 and 2’s payoffs are close and not
statistically significantly different (Wilcoxon signed-rank test for matched
pairs, p = 0.288; using session averages give the same conclusion (p =
0.4008)). Within each bargaining pair the subjects tend to hold the asset
the same amount of time (between 36 and 38% of the time). The object is
in dispute for almost 24% of the time; it is idle less than 2% of the time.
Inefficiency is thus overwhelmingly due to dispute and not to assets lying
idle; this is the case for all games.
Average Player 1 and 2 payoffs are also similar in Game 2 (and not
significantly different, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.14; at the session
level, p = 0.1614). As can be clearly seen in Figure 4, a large majority of
bargaining pairs establish an alternation between stage game payoff pairs
(4,16) and (16,4) that give approximately equal payoffs. There is however
more dispersion than in Game 1, and outcomes are generally less efficient,
due to each asset being in more dispute in Game 2 than 1. Total earn-
ings and TPE=CEF in Game 1 are significantly higher than in Game 2
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, two-sided, p = 0.01; using session aver-
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ages yields p = 0.0157). Also, with the exception of two or three bargain-
ing pairs, no one settles on a time constant behavior giving payoffs close
to (4,16) or (16,4).
Finding 1. In Games 1 and 2 most bargaining pairs generate approximately
equal overall payoffs, confirming the payoff focality of (10, 10), but dispute is
significant in both games. Moreover, there is significantly more dispute in Game
2 than in Game 1. Thus earnings and Total Payoff Efficiency in Game 2 are lower
than in Game 1. These findings reject Hypothesis 1a in favor of Hypothesis 2.
Game 3 We next consider Game 3. Figure 5 shows that a significant
proportion of bargaining pairs cluster on an equal outcome on the 45-
degree line, and that many get close to the equal and efficient outcome,
E = (6.4, 6.4), where Player 1 holds the asset 1/5 and Player 2 holds it
4/5 of the time. Twenty bargaining pairs (about 25%) satisfy a criterion
that the time proportions with which each player holds the asset differ
by no more than .1 from those that generate payoffs E. The clustering of
outcomes near E can be more clearly seen in the scatterplot in Figure 1 in
Online Appendix 3, which for each bargaining pair shows the proportion
of time the pair selected strategy profile (1, 0) and on profile (0, 1).
There is, however, a significant dispersion in payoffs. Many bargain-
ing pairs settle on payoffs on or close to other parts of the efficient fron-
tier, where there is significant inequality in favor of Player 1, and where
total earnings are higher. Player 1 earns on average more than 75% more
than Player 2 (this difference is significant, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-
sided, p < 0.0001; at the session level, p = 0.0117). On the other hand,
Player 2 holds the asset more than twice as often as Player 1. We summa-
rize these results below.
Finding 2. In Game 3 a significant proportion of bargaining pairs generate equal
and efficient payoffs E, but many pairs settle on outcomes on or close to the ef-
ficient frontier that trade off inequality and total surplus maximization. These
findings support the distributional, but not the efficiency, part of Hypothesis 1b.
Game 4 Figure 6 shows that very few bargainers get close to generating
payoffs E. Moreover, the strategy profile (1, 2) that generates equal and
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inefficient payoffs (7, 7) is on average observed less than 8% of the time.20
Instead the strategy profile (2,1) is observed almost two thirds of the time
on average. The percentage of bargaining pairs selecting strategy profile
(2, 1) at least 60, 70, 80, or 90 percent of the time equal 62, 55, 50, and 36
percent, respectively.
Game 5 Table 3 shows that bargaining pairs select each of strategy pro-
files (1, 2) and (2, 1) (giving payoffs (8, 8) and (6, 20), respectively) about
a third of the time, and only about 5% of the time do they select profile
(12, 0), where Player 1 holds both assets, which is needed for generat-
ing payoffs E. These numbers are however averages across all bargaining
pairs, so they may mask heterogeneity at the level of bargaining pairs. For
example, it is not clear if a bargaining pair tends to select only strategy
profile (1,2) or only (2,1), or if the typical bargaining pair tends to select
both profiles during the bargaining period. A closer look at the data (see
Table 5 in Online Appendix 5) reveals that 21 bargaining pairs (about 25%)
select strategy profile (1,2) at least 60% of the time, and 15 pairs (19%) se-
lect that profile 70% of the time or more. Thus a significant proportion
of bargaining pairs have a high degree of coordination on the payoff pair
(8,8), even though this is strictly dominated by E = (10, 10). There is also
significant coordination on the strategy profile (2,1), giving payoffs (6,20):
13 bargaining pairs (16%) select this strategy profile at least 60% of the
time, and 10 pairs (13%) select it 70% of the time or more.
Finding 3. In Game 5 a significant proportion of bargainers generate a time-
constant behavior giving either payoffs (8, 8) or (6, 20), while in Game 4 very
few pairs generate payoffs (7,7). This rejects Part d of Hypothesis 1 and supports
Hypothesis 3.
We next consider the payoffs E in Games 4 and 5. Table 3 shows that
in Game 4 very few bargaining pairs generate payoffs equal or close to
E = (10.9, 10.9). A more detailed look at the data reveals that only three
bargaining pairs achieve payoffs to the northeast of (9,9).21 Similarly, in
Game 5 very few pairs achieve payoffs E = (10, 10). First, strategy profile
20The percentage of bargaining pairs that generate payoffs (7, 7) at least 50% or 60% of
time equal 6% and less than 1%, respectively.
21One bargaining pair is able to get remarkably close to E = (10, 9, 10.9), achieving
payoffs (10.37,10.50). See Online Appendix 6 (Figure 25).
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(12,0) is observed very infrequently. Only 5 bargaining pairs (7%) settle on
strategy profile (12, 0) 30% or more of the time. 49 bargaining pairs have
a zero coordination rate on (12, 0), and among the remaining 29 pairs the
vast majority generate (12, 0) less than 5% of the time. See the histogram
in Figure 2 in Online Appendix 3. Table 5 in Online Appendix 5 shows
that only two out of the 78 bargaining pairs get close to E; see also the
scatterplot in Figure 3 in Online Appendix 3.
Finding 4. In both Games 4 and 5 very few bargaining pairs achieve payoffs close
to E. This, together with Finding 2, supports Hypothesis 4.
We finally consider Hypothesis 5. It is clear from Figure 7 that a significant
proportion of bargaining pairs achieve payoffs close to the line connect-
ing (8, 8) and (6, 20). Payoffs on this line require a time-varying behavior
where subjects swap the assets, that is, switch between strategy profiles
(1, 2) and (2, 1). Although strictly dominated, this time-varying behavior
is arguably simpler than the one required for generating payoffs E. Table
5 in Online Appendix 5 shows that 20 pairs (about 25%) generate each of
these strategy profiles 20% or more of the time; 12 bargaining pairs (15%)
generate each strategy profile 30% or more of the time.
Finding 5. In Game 5 a significant proportion of bargaining pairs achieve a high
degree of coordination on a time-varying behavior that gives strictly dominated
payoffs on the line connecting payoffs (8, 8) and (6, 20). This supports Hypothe-
sis 5.
7 Conclusion
We experimentally study a novel real time tacit non-cooperative bargain-
ing environment, with the aim of capturing and illuminating how the fo-
cality of payoff opportunities, and the complexity of coordinating on them
interact. We document three empirical regularities. First, ceteris paribus
higher coordination complexity is detrimental. Second, bargainers trade
off payoff focality and coordination complexity – if the equal outcome
is relatively complex, more bargainers settle on on an unequal outcome.
Third, bargainers settle on an inefficient equal outcome if is simpler than
an equal and efficient outcome, but only if the former is not dominated by
other unequal and as simple outcomes. These findings demonstrate that
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in order to predict behavior in real world bargaining situations like the
ones studied here we need to take not only the focality of payoffs but also
their coordination complexity into account.
We believe there is scope for much future research. First, one should
relax the assumption that payoffs are commonly known. Intuitively, pri-
vate payoff information make considerations based on payoff complexity
much weaker relative to coordination complexity. Second, it is relevant
to investigate if complexity matters as much much if decision makers can
communicate via cheap talk while making bargaining moves. Third, it
seems important to understand why bargainers tend not to settle on com-
plex coordination schemes. One hypothesis is that subjects are unable to
compute or even conceptualize complicated time-varying behaviors. An-
other possibility is that they do understand what intertemporal behavior
is required, but believe that others do not, and therefore find the required
complex behavior too risky. A third conjecture is that the tacit interaction
makes people pessimistic that they can generate a complex intertemporal
behavior, and hence they avoid it. Of course, all these and other factors
may play a role; our experiment was not designed to distinguish between
them, but future research can address this issue.
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